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ONLINE APPENDIX 1 - PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 2. As in Proposition 1, we obtain the optimal labor supply of
altruistic individuals by differentiating with respect to x:
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To obtain the labor supply function of an inequality averse individual, we re-write the Fehr-
Schmidt utility functions based on the productivity rank of the individual:
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Proof of Proposition 3. Consider first case of altruistic preferences, A ≥ 0. To establish
the equilibrium tax rate in this society we first re-write the utility of individual i, adjusting
for the labor supply effects of A:
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Single peakedness is easily verified, and we obtain the optimal tax for each level of produc-
tivity:
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We now compare this with the ideal tax rate of the median productivity individual if A = 0.
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The last inequality is satisfied for all A ∈ [0, 1) as long as n > 3 and w2m < 1nZ, which
completes the proof of the first half of the proposition.
Consider next the case of inequality averse preferences, with Fehr-Schmidt parameters sat-
isfying 0 < β ≤ α ≤ α¯(β, n). Given the labor supply functions derived in Proposition 2, we
can rewrite the utility of the median individual m as:
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The first-order condition becomes:
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We next show that the median ideal tax rate is higher than the baseline model with standard
preferences, the latter given by:
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Since C > 0 for n ≥ 3, we will focus on interior (tFSm , t∗m) and show that tFSm > t∗m. First, note
that the terms in D that have n2 in the denominator vanish for large n, so limn→∞D = C, so
for large n the result is proved without requiring the condition, α ≤ α¯(β, n). For small n (as
in the experiment), we need to consider the second order terms in D, in the following analysis:
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We establish the last inequality in two steps.
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Since there are an equal number of individuals with productivity above and below the median,
one can pair them in the following way:
(
n+3+2k
2
, n−1−2k
2
)
for k = 0, ..., n−3
2
. So there are n−1
2
pairs. We rewrite the inequality above as follows:
n−3
2∑
k=0
(
n− 1
n− 1 + αn+ β − n+3+2k
2
(α + β)
+
n− 1
n− 1 + αn+ β − n−1−2k
2
(α + β)
− 2
)
>
α− β
2(2 + α− β)
The left-hand side of the inequality is increasing in k, therefore, the smallest difference for
all the k-pairs is the one when k = 0, that is, it is enough to show that
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The last inequality is satisfied for α = β ∈ (0, 1). It is straightforward to show that for any
parameter β ∈ (0, 1) and any n ≥ 3, there exists β < α¯(β, n) < β n+1
n−3 such that inequality
above is satisfied for all α ∈ [β, α¯(β, n)], which completes the proof. QED
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ONLINE APPENDIX 2 - SAMPLE INSTRUCTIONS
Instructions for DD-High treatment
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making and you will be paid for
your participation in cash privately at the end of the session.
The currency in this experiment is called tokens. All payoffs are denominated in this
currency. Tokens that you earn during the experiment will be converted into US dollars
using the rate 200 Tokens = $1. In addition, you will be paid a $10 participation fee if
you complete the experiment. The money you earn will depend on your decisions and the
decisions of others.
Do not talk to or attempt to communicate with other participants during the session.
Please take a minute and turn off all electronic devices, especially phones. During the
experiment you are not allowed to open or use any other applications on these laboratory
computers, except for the interface of the experiment.
The experiment consists of two parts. Each part is self-contained and consists of 10
rounds. Before the beginning of each part, we will read out loud detailed instructions about
that part and the computer interface will be explained.
Part I: There will be 10 rounds in Part 1. Before the first round begins, all participants
will be randomly divided into groups of 5 participants each. In addition, each participant
will be assigned a value V. Your group assignment and your assigned value will stay the
same V for all 10 rounds of Part I.
There are 5 possible values of V: V = 2, V=6, V=10, V=14 and V=35. One member in
each group will be assigned V = 2, one member V=6, one member V=10, one member V=14
and one member V=35. The computer will do the assignments randomly. Your assigned
value will be displayed on your computer screen.
Your task in each round is to choose an investment level. Your investment can be any
number between 0 and 25 (up to two decimal places). If you choose investment X and your
value is V, this will generate your total investment earnings equal to V*X. For example, if V
= 10 and X=4, then your total investment earnings in that round are computed by 10*4=40
tokens.
However, investment is not free. The cost to you of investing X is equal to 0.5∗X2 In the
example just given, the investment of X=4 costs you 8 tokens. These costs are subtracted
from your earnings at the end of the round.
A portion of your investment earnings for the round will be taxed. If the tax rate is T%,
then your taxes will equal T% of your investment earnings, and you will keep the remaining
(100-T)% of your investment earnings. The amount you keep after taxes is called your after
tax investment earnings. Recall the example just given, where V = 10 and X=4, and your
total investment earnings is 40 tokens. If the tax rate is 50% then your taxes equal 20 tokens
and your after tax investment earnings, which are yours to keep, equal 20 tokens.
The taxes everyone in your group pays are not thrown away. Rather, the total taxes
collected from all members of your group are rebated to the group members in equal shares at
the end of each round. For example, if the total amount collected as taxes from all members
of the group equals 200 tokens, then each member will receive back one fifth of this amount,
6
or 40 tokens. Note that all members of the group are taxed at the same tax rate in a round,
and all group members share equally the total taxes collected in the group.
To summarize up, your payoff in a round depend on the value V assigned to you at the
beginning of round 1, your investment X, tax rate T and the tax rebate, which is determined
by the total taxes collected from all members in your group. Your total earnings in a round
consist of three parts
Total Earnings = Your After Tax Investment Earnings - Your Cost of Investment + Tax Rebate
Thus, your total earnings for the round in this example would be equal to 20−8+40 = 52
tokens.
At the beginning of each round a tax rate T will be displayed on your screen. This tax
rate is the same for all members in your group. However, your group’s tax rate may change
from round to round. After observing your group’s tax rate, you and all other members of
your group will be asked to independently choose your investment levels, which can be any
non-negative number between 0 and 25 up to two decimal places.
The screen has a calculator to assist you in deciding how much to invest in each round.
The first row of the calculator displays your group’s tax rate. You can calculate your hy-
pothetical earnings for a round by entering two different numbers. Enter a hypothetical
investment level choice in the second row and a hypothetical total taxes from the other four
members of your group in the third row. You can use the up and down buttons to try
different hypothetical levels. The fourth row then displays what your total earnings for the
round would be if those hypothetical amounts were the actual amounts in that round. (If
you enter these manually instead of using the buttons, you will need to press ”Enter” for the
calculator to work.) The numbers you enter in the calculator are just hypothetical and do
not affect your actual earnings. Remember that your tax rebate consist of one fifth of the
taxes collected from your investment earnings and one fifth of the taxes collected from the
other members of the group.
After everyone has entered their investment decision and clicked on the ”submit button”,
the computer will display your investment decision as well as the investment decisions made
by all the other members of your group. It will appear in a table that also shows their values.
All of your own information is highlighted in Red on the table. It will also show your earnings
for the round, in tokens, broken down into its three components: after tax investment income,
cost of investment, and tax rebate. All of this information is also summarized at the bottom
of your screen in the history panel. The history panel will keep track of everything that has
happened in your group in all rounds, highlighting your own information in red.
When round 1 is finished, we will move on directly to the next round. The next round
will be identical to the previous round except your group’s new tax rate T will be posted on
your screen.
Summary of Part I:
• Part I of the experiment consists of 10 rounds.
• Before the beginning of round 1, participants are divided into groups of 5 members
each.
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• Each member of the group is assigned value V: one member gets V=2, one gets V=6,
one gets V=10, one gets V=14 and one gets V=35.
• Assignment of values and the group assignments are fixed for all 10 rounds of Part I.
• In each round, a tax rate T is displayed on the screen. All members of the same group
observe the same tax rate T.
• Each member chooses an investment X (number between 0 and 25 with up to two
decimal places).
• Decisions and earnings for that round are displayed on your screen and recorded in the
history panel
Part II: Part II of the experiment also consists of 10 rounds. The group assignments do
not change. They are exactly the same as in Part I. Everyone also keeps the same assigned
value as in Part I. Just to remind you, there is one member in your group who was assigned
V = 2, one member V=6, one member V=10, one member V=14 and one member V=35.
Each round in Part II is similar to rounds in Part I of the experiment, except that at
the beginning of each round all members of the group are asked to submit a proposal for the
tax rate T.
While you are deciding what tax rate you wish to propose, the screen has a calculator to
assist you in deciding. You can calculate your hypothetical earnings for a round by entering
three different numbers. Enter a hypothetical group tax rate in the first row of the calculator.
Enter a hypothetical investment decision of yours in the second row and a hypothetical total
taxes from the other four members of your group in the third row. You can use the up and
down buttons to try different hypothetical levels. The fourth row then displays what your
total earnings for the round would be if those hypothetical amounts were the actual amounts
in that round. (If you enter these manually instead of using the buttons, you will need to
press ”Enter” for the calculator to work.) The numbers you enter in the calculator are just
hypothetical and do not affect your actual earnings. Remember that your tax rebate consist
of one fifth of the taxes collected from your investment earnings and one fifth of the taxes
collected from the other members of the group.
After each member of your group has submitted a proposed tax rate, the third highest
of the five proposed tax rates is implemented as your group’s tax rate for that round. The
chosen tax rate will be clearly posted on your screen and is the same for everyone in your
group. You will then be asked to choose an investment decision (as you did in the Part I of
the experiment). Your investment decision can be any number between 0 and 25 up to two
decimal places. You may use the calculator to explore different hypothetical scenarios, as
you did in part I.
Once everyone in your group submits their investments, your payoff will be determined
and we move on to the next round of the experiment. As before, your payoff in a round
depends on the value V assigned to you at the beginning of round 1, your investment X, tax
rate T and the tax return, which is determined by the total taxes collected from all members
in your group. More precisely, your Payoff in a round consist of three parts:
Total Earnings = Your After Tax Investment Earnings - Your Cost of Investment + Tax Rebate
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ONLINE APPENDIX 3 - ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 11: Wilcoxon Rank-sum test (p-values) comparing tax rates implemented in High
and Low inequality treatments, period-by-period.
period 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
p-value 0.0729 0.0197 0.0025 0.0015 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005
Note. Data pooled together for DD and RD regimes, last 10 periods.
Table 12: Mean Differences Between Observed and Predicted Labor Supply
High Inequality Low Inequality
DD RD DD RD
Productivity 2 0.41 (0.34) 0.90 (0.66) 0.45 (0.33) 0.01 (0.25)
Productivity 6 0.12 (0.21) 0.03 (0.07) 0.11 (0.22) -0.23 (0.28)
Productivity 10 0.30 (0.51) 0.41 (0.31) 0.38 (0.23) 0.19 (0.26)
Productivity 14 0.25 (0.18) 0.07 (0.04) -0.01 (0.36) 0.15 (0.12)
Productivity 18 -0.46 (0.59) -0.27 (0.25)
Productivity 35 -3.20* (1.64) -1.76* (0.89)
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by subject.
**=p < 0.05,*=p ∈ (0.05, 0.10]
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Table 13: DD treatment: Equity-Efficiency Tradeoff
High Inequality treatment
Equilibrium Mean observed (std err)
Tax rate 0.53 0.47 (0.04)
Gini coefficient 0.31 0.33 (0.03)
Total group income 899.14 822.47 (57.12)
Low Inequality treatment
Equilibrium Mean observed (std err)
Tax rate 0.28 0.26 (0.03)
Gini coefficient 0.35 0.35 (0.02)
Total group income 512.16 519.90 (17.72)
Notes. Robust standard errors in the parentheses are clustered by group.
Table 14: RD treatment: Equity-Efficiency Tradeoff
High Inequality treatment
Equilibrium Mean observed (std err)
Tax rate 0.53 0.54 (0.03)
Gini coefficient 0.31 0.30 (0.02)
Total group income 899.14 811.22 (58.45)
Low Inequality treatment
Equilibrium Mean observed (std err)
Tax rate 0.28 0.27 (0.07)
Gini coefficient 0.35 0.35 (0.04)
Total group income 512.16 517.17 (36.45)
Notes. Robust standard errors in the parentheses are clustered by group.
Figure 6: Equity-Efficiency Frontier in Low Inequality treatment
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Figure 7: Equity-Efficiency Frontier in High Inequality treatment
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